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29 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25 YEAR
RE-REVIEW

SUBJECT: Senior Staff Meeting, 27 May 1963

1. Agenda.

See Attachment A.

2. European Trip.

See Attachment B which contains the principal remarks made by Mr. Cline.

3. Decision-making Process of the White House.

Mr. Cooper started by saying that the present White House group was distinctive on two accounts: it concentrated on foreign affairs and liked to work through people and not institutions. One hopeful sign is the decline of the task force.

a. NSC. A very flexible organization. Bundy decides on all agendas.

- (1) Executive Secretariat - Bromley Smith.
- (2) NSC itself.
- (3) Executive Committee. Used during Cuba.
- (4) NSC Standing Group. Every Tuesday at 5:00.
No alternates. Only one member to an agency.

b. Special Groups.

- (1) 5412 - agency receives agenda.
- (2) SG/CI - chaired by Harriman.
- (3) SG/CI/Assistance - Mike Forrestal chairs.

c. Cabinet. Doesn't get into things much.

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- d. Rostow's Tuesday Lunches - planning group.
- e. White House Staff - Two groups, really indistinguishable.
 - (1) NSC staff.
 - (2) White House staff proper.

4. General Carter followed up on Mr. Cooper's remarks by saying it was vital that the office of the ~~D~~DCI be kept informed of the results of meetings in Washington that concern the Agency. It is not safe to assume that the DCI, DDCI and Executive Director will know about them. Since the DCI has delegated, in his absence, all Agency responsibilities to the DDCI, he (DDCI) must be kept informed of everything.

5. Mr. Echols commented on four points.

a. Blood Donor Program. We need new talent to give blood since "regulars" have accounted for a heavy percentage in the past. The summer months are lax for blood giving. A "recognition" program will be established.

b. Savings Bond Drive. The Agency program is promising but not sensational.

c. PAMA Insurance. The period for signing up goes only through the end of June.

d. Special Interest Personal Cases. Although our choices for employment are not affected by applicants with special contacts, we do wish to make sure these cases are handled expeditiously and politely.

6. Mr. Kirkpatrick commented on these points:

a. The Professionalism Paper. Since it is to be a living paper, Mr. Kirkpatrick asked that appropriate additions be supplied from time to time.

b. Agency Life Insurance Policies. Supervisors should remind their people that the Agency has several very inexpensive policies for which all CIA employees are eligible.

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c. Emergency Planning. An updated CIA Master Emergency Plan is now being formulated which will be tied into the "DefCon" situation.

d. CIA/DIA Relations. Any unresolved problems should be referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick.



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Attachments A and B.

AGENDA
Senior Staff Meeting
Monday, 27 May 1963, 11:00 a.m.

1. **Decision Making Process of the White House** **Cooper**
(12 min.)

2. **European Trip** **Cline**
(12 min.)

3. **Office of Personnel Comments** **Echols**
 - a. **Blood Donor Program**
 - b. **Savings Bond Drive**
 - c. **Special Interest Personnel Cases**
 - d. **Parents Insurance Program**

4. **Comments** **Kirkpatrick**
 - a. **Professionalism Paper**
 - b. **Life Insurance Policies for which CIA employees are eligible**
 - c. **Emergency Planning**
 - d. **Problems with DIA**

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

25 May 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Europe in the '60's

1. I have just returned from a trip to England, France, Italy and Germany. I was struck by such a change in attitudes and atmosphere since my last visit several years ago that I find myself re-examining my own preconceptions (and the preconceptions of others) with respect to the world of the '60's, particularly as they relate to American policies and aspirations vis-a-vis Europe.

2. Western Europe appeared to me to be well on the way toward the Americanization which European intellectuals used to rail against, but which now seems to be accepted as virtually inevitable. By Americanization, I mean concentration on economic affluence of the middle class and exploitation of the internal market for quantity produced consumer goods. Preoccupation with movies, television, cars, Coca-Cola (or the local equivalent) is most widespread.

3. This preoccupation with material well being is most striking among the people in their 40's and 50's who, for the first time in many years, possess a sense of security both economically and strategically. After a lifetime spent in the depression of the 1930's, World War II, and the post-war reconstruction/Soviet threat period, these people are savoring the pleasures of material comfort and absence of immediate military danger. For the most part, on the basis of my observations--which naturally were limited, they are not clamoring for nuclear weapons, either control of ours or possession of their own. They are susceptible to sentimentality about their national pride and traditions, and DeGaulle's appeal to this sentiment strikes responsive chords in most of Western Europe. None of the people who are going to be running things in Western Europe through most of the 1960's, however, are inclined to battle for "independence" or for NATO or for anything else if they can help it. They are not frightened of poverty, though they remember it well, and they are not concerned about the threat of war, although they are consciously or subconsciously aware that their security depends on US military strength.

4. The Germans have a special interest in keeping the Americans in Europe, and will go along with almost any NATO rigmarole which

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SUBJECT: Europe in the '60's

will please us. Most people, however, see our multilateral force maneuvers as a kind of charade which we are playing for our own benefit while pretending we are responding to a European demand (which does not yet exist) for control of nuclear weapons. They are not at all enchanted with extra financial burdens for military forces, nuclear or conventional.

5. The Communist vote in Italy, Labor strength in the U.K., and the unprecedented temerity of German workers in striking for more pay, reflect, in my opinion, the effort of the relatively under-privileged one-third of these West European societies to get in on some of the affluence which the middle class has created and is enjoying. There will be more of this jockeying for "trickle down" social benefits and more local communist efforts to exploit it politically.

6. In all of these countries, there is, among many intellectuals, some spiritual discontent with what they usually describe as the growing materialism of Europe and this gives rise to demands for heroic aims a la DeGaulle, or European integration, or German reunification. In view of the strength of the contrary trend, these more spiritual aims seem likely to proceed slowly in the 1960's, although the emotional appeal of German reunification promises to become a serious matter with the younger people who are reminded of the problem constantly by Berlin and who are less impressed with the advantages of simple security than their elders.

7. What Europe seems to me to be groping for is a system of balanced power (a new Castlereagh creation) and a new stability in Central Europe (a Metternichean legitimacy) that will enable the Europeans to have their present affluence and security plus their self-respect.

8. These problems of Europe today seem to me to be of an entirely different mold than we faced when NATO was created in the early 1950's and, as a matter of fact, quite different from the problems we face in more primitive parts of the world. In the Middle East and North Africa nearly every nation is going through a troubled period in which a feudal or recently colonial society is trying to find stable, reasonably honest government leadership which can set these peoples on the path toward at least a modest betterment of their standard of living. Naturally, the USSR fishes in these troubled waters as well as it can to prevent stabilization and increase communist influence. These people, or the articulate elite among them, for quite different reasons from those of the West Europeans, also do not like to think about or devote resources to the Soviet/

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SUBJECT: Europe in the '60's

United States conflict. They want to be left alone to run their own affairs, although they welcome economic handouts. Competition for local political power, one of the few lucrative commodities to be had in these nations, will be severe, in fact violent, for a long time.

9. This picture of the charms of "normalcy" in Europe and the turmoil of undeveloped countries seeking the path to affluence and "normalcy" is not altogether encouraging, but it is fair to note that the relative freedom from fear of the early 1960's has tended to relax and disunite the Soviet and communist world as well as our own. Thus Khrushchev has trouble with his intellectuals and his various claimants on national economic resources, and has to fight a bitter battle with the Chinese, who are trying to stake out east and southeast Asia as an area where the decadent habits and aspirations of the capitalist West or "revisionist" Moscow are not to be allowed to dilute revolutionary drive or to soften revolutionary austerity until Chinese communist hegemony has been assured.

10. Ironically, it seems to me we end up with a world which for all its sticky problems is gradually moderating into something like a bearable existence for the majority of peoples, except for the brute fact of China under control of the Peiping regime, which is a tremendously disturbing reality for the USSR as well as for us.



RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE May 1963
TO: <input type="text"/>		
ROOM NO.	<input type="text"/>	
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REMARKS: You may be interested in my reflections on a recent European trip, based mainly on talks with my professional associates, American and foreign. RAY S. CLINE		
FROM: O/DD/I		
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FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55	REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.	GPO : 1957-O-439445 (47)

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